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CALCULATING PRIVACY PRESERVING REACH
USING HYPERLOGLOG SKETCHES
ABSTRACT
Methods for measuring cross media content exposure across multiple publishers in a
privacy preserving way are disclosed. The solutions described can accommodate publishing
platforms that vary in size and computational resources without hindering performance or
accuracy. Proposed is a solution to implement a privacy-safe HyperLogLog sketch
implementation that can be applied to the cross media content exposure problem, as well as other
problems that require privacy safe multi-set cardinality estimation. The processes described
herein include publishers constructing encrypted HyperLogLog sketches and transmitting the
encrypted sketches to worker computing devices, the worker computing devices joining the
encrypted sketches, the worker computing devices finding the minimum value of each register in
the joined sketch, and summing the registers to compute the multi-set cardinality estimate.
SUMMARY
Measuring cross media content reach across multiple content publishers in a privacy
preserving way can be challenging. Content publishing platforms vary in size and computational
resources, meaning effective solutions must accommodate limited computational resources and
capabilities.
When computing multiparty set cardinality, the size of the data structure can scale with
the size of the number of client devices in the set, which can impose a large computational
overhead on all participants proportional to the largest publisher. This means a small publisher
that serves a smaller amount of content would have to pay the same computational cost as a
publisher that serves a very large amount of content.
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The HyperLogLog algorithm can be used to estimate the cardinality of multisets, for
example sets of user identifiers from different content publishers. HyperLogLog can estimate
the cardinality of a multiset of uniformly distributed random numbers by calculating the number
of leading zeros in a binary representation of each number in the set. For example, if the
maximum number of leading zeros observed is n, the estimate of the number of distinct elements
in the set can be 2n. To obtain the multiset of uniformly distributed numbers, at least one hash
function can be applied to each member in the set.
HyperLogLog can implement a data structure that can be used in the estimation of the
cardinality of multisets of many different sizes, including large and very large multisets.
HyperLogLog can be easy to implement, have a small space overhead, and a very low error rate.
However, without additional processing, HyperLogLog may not preserve privacy of the entries
of the multiset. The systems and methods described herein can use HyperLogLog while
protecting privacy without sacrificing the accuracy of the estimation for large datasets.
Techniques based on HyperLogLog implementations can estimate cardinality on large
multisets. HyperLogLog sketches from multiple sources can be computationally efficient to
combine because they can be combined using a constant number of max operations. The
systems and methods detailed herein describe techniques that allow for make each HyperLogLog
sketch to be made private before sharing, without destroying the accuracy of the cardinality
estimate. HyperLogLog sketches are favorable because they are easy to implement, have good
accuracy, have low space requirements and are very scalable, thereby improving the performance
of cardinality estimating computer systems.
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DESCRIPTION
The systems and methods of this technical solution can allow each publisher to generate a
HyperLogLog sketch, and then transform the sketch into a different format that can be encrypted
with an additive homomorphic scheme (e.g., using ElGamal encryption, etc.). Content
publishers can send their encrypted HyperLogLog sketches to semi-trusted workers that all must
work together to combine the HyperLogLog sketches, and compute the reach estimate in a way
that protects the user identifiers used to generate each publisher's HyperLogLog sketch. The cost
imposed on publishers in this scheme is a small constant amount of encryptions that can be
independent of the size of other publishers, or the number of possible user identifiers. This small
cost (e.g., seconds of CPU time and MBs of storage, etc.) cab allow small publishers (e.g.,
publishers with a small number of user identifiers, a small amount of computational resources,
etc.) to participate in the system.
The systems and methods described herein for combining HLLs in homomorphic space
can utilize a reformulation of the estimation equation used in HyperLogLog. The systems and
methods described herein can transform the sum of small floating point numbers to a sum of
integer values so that it can be computed homomorphically in ciphertext. This can allow the
system to compute the estimate using the HyperLogLog sketches without revealing sensitive
pieces of information (e.g., user identifiers, other metadata, etc.) from any HyperLogLog sketch.
The process for doing so is described below.
In some implementations, HyperLogLog, the most significant bit of each register can be
stored because the exponentiation only needs to be computed at the time of estimation.
Homomorphic addition is much simpler than homomorphic exponentiation. So it is desirable to
change the registers to store full integer values of the terms in Z. Since M[ j ] is an integer value
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between 0 and L - k, we can make a common denominator of all the terms in the summation
equal of 2^(L-k). Since L and k are both constant, so is 2^(L - k). This is reflected in Equation 1
below.

Equation 1
Another way to think about this is term in the sum Z is a floating point number
representable in binary with exactly one 1. Multiplying by 2^(L-k) would turn such a value into
an integer.

The sum of registers can then be expressed as the sum of integers divided by a constant
without loss of precision. Creating the union of HyperLogLog sketches can be performed by
choosing the max of the most significant bit value in each register. When representing register
values as integers, as described herein, the systems and methods of this technical solution can
determine the minimum value of each register. To compute the cardinality of the union, the
systems and methods of this technical solution can compute sums across registers, and mins
within registers across HyperLogLog sketches. The systems and methods of this technical
solution provide at least two techniques for computing cross publisher reach. At least one
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technique is based on the Paillier crypto system. At least one other technique based on Ring
Learning with Errors.
Each technique described herein can include at least these steps:
1.

Constructing encrypted HyperLogLog sketches by publisher computing devices,

and sending those encrypted HyperLogLog sketches to worker computing devices;
2.

Joining, by at least one worker computing device, the encrypted HyperLogLog

sketches;
3.

Finding, by at least one worker computing device, the minimum value of each

register;
4.

Summing, by at least one worker computing device, the registers to compute an

estimate; and
5.

Revealing, by at least one worker computing device, the estimate.

The techniques described in this technical solution can be applied in scenarios where
multiple parties want a count of data items across them without revealing information about the
items themselves. For example, hospitals counting incidents of diseases.
A description of the HyperLogLog algorithm is described herein in brief overview. A
HyperLogLog sketch comprises m registers, where m = 2k, which can be initialized to an
initialization value (e.g., zero). An item (e.g., data entry, collection of binary data, etc.) can be
added to a HLL by using a hash function, H, that produces L character long bit strings. The first
k characters of the hash can be used as an index for a register, M. The register can store the
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position of the most significant bit of the remaining L - k bits, if it is greater than what is already
present.

It can be easy to union HyperLogLog sketches from the same user identifier space. The
systems and methods described herein can select the maximum value across all HyperLogLog
sketeches for each register.

Each register can be an approximation of the cardinality. The cardinality estimate E can be the
harmonic mean given by the following Equation:

In the above equation, m is the number of registers, am is a constant and Z is a sum determined by
the values in the registers, M[*], given by the following equation.
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The space for a HyperLogLog sketch can grow in proportion to the Log(Log(n)), where n is the
cardinality of the multiset. The final estimate of an HLL can have relative error proportional to
the number of registers, given by the following expression.

The systems and methods of this technical solution can compute the cardinality of the union of
HyperLogLog sketches from different publishers while protecting the privacy of the user
identifiers in each HyperLogLog sketch. The systems and methods described herein can merge
the HyperLogLog sketches from each publisher, and the Z of the merged HyperLogLog sketches
can be computed using homomorphic properties of an encryption system. The systems and
methods of this technical solution can compute the cross-publisher cardinality without revealing
the registers from any single publisher’s HyperLogLog sketch. Z can be a non-constant term,
the only term in E that is not constant, thus homomorphically computing Z would give us E.
Paillier Based Solution
The systems and methods of this technical solution can implement a paillier based solution. In
such implementations, the publisher computing devices can be assumed to be honest but curious.
The Paillier cryptosystem can be based on an RSA modulus which can be additively
homomorphic.
Homomorphic properties
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D(E(x) * E(y) mod n2) = x + y mod n



D(E(x) y mod n2) = xy mod n

Given a list of cipher texts the systems and methods described herein can find the minimum
value without revealing the values themselves. This can be done by pairwise tests of inequality.
Such protocols describe a way for parties A and B with secrets a, and b respectively to test if a <
b without revealing a or b. This can be done using the homomorphic properties of Paillier as well
as limiting the values that can be encrypted to n/2 rather than n.
A simple overview of a less than comparison.
1. A: computes Enc(a) and sends to B
2. B chooses random numbers 0 <= r’ <= r
3. B: computes Enc(c) = Enc(a) r ꞏ Enc(−r ꞏ b + r ′ ) = Enc(r ꞏ a − r ꞏ b r ′ ).
4. A: Dec(Enc(c)) = r ꞏ a − r ꞏ b - r ′
a. The decrypted value is a random number, but if it is less than n/2 the a - b > 0
otherwise a - b <= 0.

For a list of N ciphertexts, A and B can find one of the minimum ciphertexts by doing O(N)
comparisons. The plaintext values may not be revealed, but a partial ordering is. Supporting the
equality test can implement cutting the message space into a positive and negative sets. The
divided plaintext space cam be large enough to include the maximum difference of values being
compared, cubed. For example, a HyperLogLog with a 64 bit hash a k = 14 that is:
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The protocol can make use of a version of the Paillier encryption scheme with thresholds. The
steps of the protocol can include
1. Constructing Encrypted HyperLogLog sketches (at publishers) and sending to workers
2. Joining Encrypted HyperLogLog sketches
3. Shuffling to hide the index of registers and the association of registers to the publisher.
4. Finding the min value of each register.
5. Summing registers to reveal the value Z which is used to compute E.
6. Noise is added to the final estimate before releasing outside of workers.

Setup:
1. A threshold Paillier key is created and each worker gets a share of a share of the secret
key for decrypting values. The public key is shared with all publishers.

Computing E from multiple HyperLogLog sketches:
1. Each publisher computes a HyperLogLog sketch using 214 registers and a 64 bit hash
function.
2. Before sharing HyperLogLog sketches, publishers store 250-msb.
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3. Publishers encrypt each register value using Paillier encryption. Each register value is
encrypted with the public key. The publishers then send the encrypted HyperLogLog
sketch registers to a single worker. In some implementations, the system can distribute
among all workers, and combine.
4. For each register, the worker creates a list of all encrypted values from all the publishers
by joining them together.

5. Register identifiers are discarded and each worker can shuffle the ordering of the list of
registers as well as order of each encrypted value in the registers. The cipher text values
of the values can change at each worker so the association of register values to publishers
is not known to any worker. The systems and methods of this technical solution can reencrypt the messages, that is to use the homomorphic property and add an encrypted zero
to the cipher text.
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1. Considering a different model where workers could be dishonest, this shuffle
would be sufficient to remove the link of MSB value to register and publisher as
long as one worker is honest. There are some schemes to do a verifiable shuffle.

6. Workers can perform a reduce operation on the values in register lists via a pairwise
inequality test of encrypted messages to see if X < Y. Because both rows and columns
have been permuted learning the result of X < Y will not reveal anything about values
from publishers. This reduce operation is easy to run in parallel, each worker could be in
charge of finding the mins for a subset of the rows. In summary a single operation of the
reduce is done by:
1. The worker choose two random numbers r and r’ s.t. 0 <= r’ < r
2. Computes an inequality test for X and Y, and its share of the decryption of t

3. Decrypts t with its secret share of key
4. Send t to all other workers to decrypt
5. Each worker sends its portion of the decryption Ci to Wn
6. At Wn, the message t can be decrypted which is a random number that only
indicates the sign of the subtracted terms. If Dec(t) < n / 2 then x - y was a
positive value meaning x > y, so Wn tells W1 to keep Y, otherwise Wn tells W1 to
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keep X. We don’t actually know if X == Y but for finding the min value such a
distinction is not needed.

7. At the beginning of this step we have the minimum values for each of the rows still
encrypted. Once the minimum value has been discovered for all the registers in the HLL,
sum all registers values in ciphertext.

8. Divide 250 by the decrypt summed result to get the value Z, which is used to compute E.
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1. If E < 5m, Correct for the bias using HyperLogLogNo_Bias which can be based on
empirical results for the values for E and m.
2. Add noise to the estimate so the final result is differentially private. The
sensitivity after bias correction is low.

Privacy and Security


The sum of the registers, Z, can be revealed to the computation. No single register value
nor its association with a publisher is revealed.



This Z value has information about what is in some register for the combined
HyperLogLog sketches. In particular, this final sum is a 64 bit number, where the
probability of bits being set is linked back to the minimum register value. This means
each bit of the integer in the final sum reveals information with higher probability than
the previous bit.



The register values from all publishers are grouped into lists. Then the order of the lists,
as well as the order of the encrypted values in each list, are shuffled by each worker.
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Non-limiting Example Data

Example Simulation
In this section, described are various example simulations that implement some or all of the
techniques described herein. These implementations are purely example and should not be
considered as limiting in any way.
Described herein are simulations implemented to execute on one machine and one CPU.
Because the size of a HyperLogLog sketch is fixed regardless of the size of the multiset being
estimated the simulation may not include making interesting and diverse sets.

Setup of example simulation:
1. There are three workers all with a share of a Paillier secret key. Secret key was generated
by a trusted authority (although it could be done without such an authority).
2. 3 Publishers have HyperLogLog sketches with varying sizes, 1k 24k and 0. There was no
overlap in elements between any HyperLogLog sketches.
3. Each publisher creates and encrypts their HyperLogLog sketch and sends it to one worker
for combining. Sending can include passing to the EncryptedHLLTable class.
4. Each worker shuffles the table rows / cols while re-encrypting each element
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5. One worker starts the min discovery by creating test messages which are partially
decrypted by all workers, but only the last one sees all the shares. In a prod
implementation this step would be done in parallel with a random worker assignments for
discovering the min of each row.
6. All minimum values are summed homomorphically. And used to estimate cardinality
using HLLno_bias as described herein. This does not require knowing any of the register
values, just the final estimation.

The estimated cardinality was the same when merging in the clear and when merging via the
MPC. Both came out to 25090.78 which is off the true value by 0.36%

Publishers have a single sketch which is encrypted and sent to a worker. Their total resource use
per sketch is 2^14 encryptions which takes ~2.6 seconds on a single CPU for a total encrypted
sketch size of just under 5 Mb. These numbers are constant with respect to the number of
workers and publishers.

Workers see a combined sketch table that is #publishers * size per sketch, so 15 mb in this test.
Each of the steps has a different amount of resource utilization


Shuffling to hide which registers belong to which publisher.
o

Each worker re-encrypts the messages in the combined HLL table and shuffles the
rows / cols.



Finding the min value of each register and summing
o

This requires creating 2^14 * 3 min test messages and decrypting all of them.
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The time values in the table below are wall clock time values for each step when running on 1
CPU, so not quite CPU time. Numbers in parentheses are the cost at each worker.

Key

KeyGen Enc

size
1024

2048

4096

Shuffle

Summing Mins

2.6

25.47 sec

56.4 min (19 min)

sec

(8.49 sec)

9.82

93.3 sec

sec

(31.3 sec)

38.1

327.6 sec

DNF - A guess would be in the range of 39 hours

sec

(109.2 sec)

(13 hours) since there is roughly a 6.5X increase

HLL
13 sec

84 sec

182 sec

6.2 h (2.08 hours)

when decrypting a share
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The table below shows the performance of an example Paillier implementation. Times are all in
milliseconds and were measured as averages the wall clock time of running on a single CPU over
thousands of operations.

Key Size

Encryption

Decrypt a share

Combine shares

Enc x < y

1024 bits

0.15

31.7

1.62

4.72

2048 bits

0.61

224.8

5.89

16.7

4096 bits

2.31

1542.8

26.9

70.0
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